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Article 3

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
REVOCATION OF A WILL BY BIRTH OF A CHILD

By

WILLIAM LENTZ*

In the April, 1934 term of the Court of Appeals, there
was presented, apparently for the first time in Maryland,
the question whether the will of a testator executed after
marriage was revoked by operation of law by the subsequent birth of a child.' The decision in the affirmative came
as a surprise to most Maryland lawyers as they had theretofore considered that the only variance from the statutory provisions for revocation 2 was the well recognized
doctrine that when marriage and birth of issue both occurred subsequent to the execution of a will, the instrument was revoked by operation of law. It is the purpose
of this paper to discuss the Karr v. Robinson case in the
light of previous expressions of the Court and the cases
cited by it and to consider whether the present state of the
law is satisfactory either to testators or to the legal profession.
The first case throwing any light on the attitude of the
Court of Appeals toward extra-statutory revocation is
Sewell v. Slingluff.8 In that case Mrs. Slingluff, the wife
of Fielder C. Slingluff, executed a last will and testament
in 1867 by which she bequeathed all of her property unto
her mother, Mrs. Sewell. Mrs. Slingluff was then childless but later in the same year she gave birth to a child who
died a year later. In 1868, a second child, Richard, was
born. When Mrs. Slingluff died in 1869, she was survived
by her mother, her husband, and this son. The will had
been delivered by Mrs. Slingluff to her husband, who, in
turn, had passed it over to Mrs. Sewell. When in 1875,
Mrs. Sewell declared her intention to present the will for
probate and assert her rights as legatee thereunder, Mr.
* Of the Baltimore City bar; A.B., 1912, St. John's College; Graduate Student, 1912-1913, Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., 1916, Harvard Law
School; Lecturer on Wills and Administration, University of Baltimore Law
School.
1 Karr v. Robinson, 167 Md. 375, 173 Atl. 584 (1934) ; noted in (1935) 35

Col. L. Rev. 787.
9 Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 383.
'57 Md. 537 (1882).
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Slingluff filed a bill in equity on behalf of his son, Richard,
and himself, alleging that the testatrix had executed, the
will and delivered it to him with the request and positive
understanding and direction that it was not to be held or
taken or probated as her last will and testament in case
she should die leaving issue, but in the event of her leaving issue, should be wholly inoperative so that her estate
should pass as if it had never been executed. The prayer
of the bill was that Mrs. Sewell be enjoined from offering
the paper for probate -and that she be ordered to produce
the same for cancellation. After hearing the testimony in
support of the allegations of the bill, the Court passed a
decree practically in accordance with the prayers and enjoined Mrs. Sewell from offering the will for probate and
directed that it be brought into Court for cancellation.
On appeal by Mrs. Sewell, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Stone, reversed the lower court and dismissed the bill, holding that the will was valid when made
and that parol declarations of the testatrix "whether made
before, after or at the time of the execution of the will"
were not admissible to render that will inoperative at some
future time and in the event of some future contingency,
for to do so would be nothing more or less than to allow a
parol revocation of it. After noting that "the paper itself contains no condition whatsoever but gives the whole
property of the testatrix to her mother unconditionally",
the Court observed that "every condition allowed by law
can be put in a will and no good reason can be shown why
every testator who desires a conditional will does not make
one'
Judge Stone solemnly declared that the Code5
'Sewell v. Slingluff, supra note 3, 549, 551.
5
Md. Code, Art. 93, Sec. 302 (now Sec. 333) reads as follows: "No will in
writing devising lands, tenements or hereditaments, or bequeathing any
goods, chattels or personal property of any kind as heretofore described,
nor any clause thereof, shall be revocable otherwise than by some other
will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same, or by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating the same, by the testator himself or
in his presence, and by his direction and consent; but all devises and bequests so made shall remain and continue in force until the same be
destroyed by burning, cancelling, tearing or obliterating the same by the
testator or by his direction, in manner aforesaid, unless the same be altered
by some other will or codicil in writing or other writing of the devisor
signed as hereinbefore said in the presence of two or more witnesses
declaring the same."
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pointed out the only mode by which a will could be revoked
or annulled. He stated:
"This statute is imperative in its terms and no
mere verbal declarations of a testator, however strongly expressed and however earnestly he may wish or
intend so to do, can have any effect upon a will after
its execution. It can only be revoked in the manner
prescribed by the statute." (Italics supplied.) 6
The section of the Code referred to is modelled after
Section Six of the famous Statute of Frauds, passed in
1667," and was embodied in the Maryland law by the acts
of 1798.8 It is to be noted, however, that Section Six of
the Statute of Frauds related only to real estate, testamentary disposition of personalty being provided for in Section Twenty-two and that the closing phrase of Section
Six "any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding" is not included in our statute.
A few years after the decision of Sewell v. Slingluff,
the Court of Appeals in Baldwin v. Spriggs,9 sustained a
ruling of the Orphans' Court that the will of a testator executed after his first marriage and the birth of issue, was
revoked by the subsequent marriage and birth of a child,
in the absence of any provision in the will for the children
of the subsequent marriage. The testator had executed
his will in 1865, disposing of all of the property he then
possessed to his wife, Ruth, and his children by her. Ruth
died in 1871 and the testator thereafter intermarried with
one Maggie E. Bane and by her had several children. He
died in 1886 leaving his second wife, a child by the first
wife and children by the second wife, surviving him. The
caveat was filed by the testator's second wife in behalf of
herself and her children.
The opinion in the Baldwin case was likewise written for
the Court by Judge Stone. He found that in the June Term,
1884, the same question had been before the Court in the
unreported case of Sedwick v. Sedwick, wherein the order
Sewell v. Slingluff, supra note 3, 548.
129 Chas. II, cap. 3.
'Acts 1798, Ch. 101, Subch. 1, Sec. 4.
'65 Md. 373, 5 Atl. 295 (1886).
8
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of the Orphans' Court refusing probate of a will made before marriage and birth of a child had been affirmed. In
recognizing the general rule that a will was revoked by the
subsequent marriage and birth of a child, the Court referred to the exception where "the testator had made
provision for his children born after the execution of
the will. As the origin of the rule was the duty of the
parent to provide for his offspring, this exception seems
right and proper".1°
After briefly reviewing the English cases decided in
favor of the rule, the Court expressly repudiated Lord
Mansfield's view that the rule should rest on the presumption that the testator intended to revoke his will if he married and had issue. This view was held to be "irreconcileable with the Statute of Frauds. It would, in effect, allow
the will to be revoked by the subsequent intention of the
testator, without such intention being evidenced by the posThe
itive acts so expressly required by that statute".,
true basis of the rule, the Court determined, was that enunciated by Lord Kenyon that there was "a tacit condition
annexed to the will when made that it should not take effect if there should be a total change in the situation of thc
testator 's family".1
Despite Judge Stone's observation that "the origin of
the rule was the duty of the parent to provide for his offspring", it seems to have been regarded as the settled law
of Maryland prior to 1934 that there must be a concurrence of marriage and birth of a child in order for a prior
will in which no provision is made for after-born children,
to be revoked, and that birth of a child alone did not operate to revoke an existing will.
Edward Otis Hinkley (who incidentally represented
Mrs. Sewell in Sewell v. Slingluff) in his treatise" quotes
with apparent approval from Jarman on Wills that prior
to the Act of 1 Victoria, Chapter 26, marriage of a woman
absolutely revoked her will but marriage of a man had no
Baldwin v. Spriggs, supra note 9, 381.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Testamentary Law of Maryland, 1878, Sec. 116.
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such effect. Quoting further from Jarman,'14 the text continues:
"Nor did birth of a child alone revoke a will made
after marriage since a married testator must be supposed to contemplate such event, and the circumstances
that the testator left his wife enciente without knowing it, was held not to impart to the posthumous birth
any revoking effect. Marriage and birth of a child conjointly, however, revoked a will whether of real or
personal estate; these circumstances producing such
a total change in the testator's situation as to lead to
a presumption that he could not intend a disposition
of property previously made to continue unchanged." 5
In the supplement 16 to his treatise Mr. Hinkley stated:
"As a general rule marriage and the birth of issue operated as a revocation of a will previously made" and cited
Baldwin v. Spriggs but nowhere did he intimate that birth
alone revoked.
It is interesting to observe that evidently the bar accepted Mr. Hinkley's statement of the law, for such distinguished counsel as John P. Poe and S. Teackle Wallis
did not see fit, according to the summary of their argument as reported in the Sewell case, even to suggest the
possibility that birth of a child operated as a matter of
law as a revocation of Mrs. Slingluff's will. Nor did counsel in their briefs in the Baldwin case in any way intimate
that anything less than marriage and subsequent birth
would operate as an implied revocation.
It is also to be noted that the Court in the Slingluff
case would have been glad to find in favor of the surviving
husband and son rather than the mother of the testatrix,
for Judge Stone said:
"If it (parol evidence) were in any such case admissible, we would be unwilling to reject it in this, as
the straightforward testimony and disinterested conduct of the husband of the testatrix presents a strong
1 5th

Amer. Ed. from the 4th London Ed., 1880, Ch. VII, Sec. 1.
5In Sec. 117 Mr. Hinkley refers to the case of Tongue v. Morton, 6 H. &
J. 21 (1823) in which the Court of Appeals referred to the question whether
marriage and birth of child revoked a will previously made but refrained
from passing upon it.
'1 1888, Sec. 117-A.
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case, and one with many equitable features strongly
appealing to our sense of justice. But we must take
the law as we find it; and as in all the long period that
has elapsed since the passage of the Act of 29th Charles
such testimony to be received,
II no court has permitted
7
we cannot do so now."1
Sewell v. Slingluff has been cited with approval by the
Court of Appeals in at least a half a dozen cases as authority for the proposition that parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a will. 18
Baldwin v. Spriggs and some of the English authorities
were discussed and approved in Roane v. Hollingshead. 9
In that case a feme sole in 1889 executed her last will and
testament. She married in 1891 and died the following
year. When the will was propounded, the surviving husband filed a caveat claiming that it had been revoked by
the subsequent marriage of his wife. The Court of Appeals sustained the Orphans' Court and ruled that the will
had not been revoked. Judge McSherry pointed out 2" that
by the Code a married woman had the right to dispose of
her property the same as a married man in that all the
common law restrictions formerly imposed upon disposition of property by a married woman had been removed.
He indicated the Court's approval of the doctrine that
marriage and birth of issue effected a revocation because
of the tacit condition annexed to the will when made that
it should not take effect if there should be a total change in
the situation of the testator's family. "Marriage alone
never did revoke the will of a man but marriage and birth
of issue did, because the will when made was made with
the tacit condition that it would not take effect upon such
'21
a contingency coming to pass."
Again, in 1917 in Redwood v. Howison,22 the Court of
Appeals, speaking through the late Judge Thomas, approved Baldwin v. Spriggs. The will of Dr. R. Dorsey
17 Sewell v. Slingluff, supra note 3,
's The latest such case is Garner

554.
v. Garner, 167 Md. 423, 173 Atl. 386

(1934).
"76 Md. 369, 25 AtI. 307, 17 L. R. A. 592 (1892).
Ibid, 371. Md. Code, Art. 45, secs. 1, 2.
Ibid, 374.
129 Md. 577, 99 At. 863 (1917).
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Coale left everything to his wife. As she had predeceased
him, her next of kin claimed her share under the statute
preventing the lapsing of legacies. Dr. Coale's kin, however, contended, inter alia, that his wife's death brought
about a complete change in his family and with it an implied revocation of his will. The Court refused to extend
the doctrine of Baldwin v. Spriggs and held that the will
of the testator was not revoked by the death of his wife
and stated that if marriage of a man did not work a revocation of his will, certainly the death of his wife cannot
have that effect.
In view of the foregoing decisions and language of the
Court of Appeals, and the attitude of leading members of
the bar, it was at first blush somewhat startling to read
that the Court had ruled in Karr v. Robinson that birth of
a child alone effected a revocation of a testator's will made
prior to that event, and after marriage.
In this case the testator, Alfonso P. Robinson, executed
his will on November 20, 1929, after the death of his first
wife and after his second marriage but before the birth of
any children by his second wife. When he died on December 31, 1933, he was survived by two daughters by his first
wife, his second wife and a child by the second wife, and
another child was expected shortly. By the terms of the
will he devised and bequeathed all of his property in trust,
one-third for the benefit of his surviving wife and one-third
for the benefit of each of his two daughters by the earlier
marriage. The widow individually and as next friend of
her child filed a caveat on the ground that there had been
a total change in the situation of the family of the testator
by the birth of one child and the strong probability that
another would be born, and that therefore, by said change
in the status of the family, the alleged will had been revoked
impliedly and by operation of law.
Apparently there was attached to Robinson's will and
introduced in evidence a letter written by him on July 19,
1933, addressed to his attorney, Harry E. Karr, Esq., and
reading as follows:
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"Regarding my Will, in view of my having another
heir, it should be changed somewhat. The name of
that lady is ' Sarah Riley'.
"I also wish to eliminate that part of my will in
which I make my sister's children beneficiaries. Instead, I wish the trusteeship dissolved and the money
turned over to each of my children at the age of thirtyfive. I, however, wish to continue the trusteeship for
my wife."
In passing, it is difficult to reconcile the admission in
evidence of the letter with the repeated statements by the
Court that parol evidence is not admissible to effect a
change in a will. At most, the letter shows an intention by
Robinson to change his will but such an intention should
not have any effect unless it is executed in conformity with
the requirements of the Wills Act.
From the action of the Orphans' Court of Harford
County in refusing to admit the will to probate, Mr. Karr,
as the Executor named therein and as guardian of the
daughters by the first marriage, appealed. The appellate
court frankly recognized the sole question to be "whether
the subsequent birth of a child alone without a subsequent
marriage was sufficient to revoke the will." In deciding in
the affirmative, the Court, speaking through Judge Pattison,
quoted from Baldwin v. Spriggs and reviewed the theories
upon which the doctrine announced in that case rested. The
opinion laid particular stress on the point that the ground
upon which Lord Kenyon placed the rule was that there was
"a tacit condition annexed to the will when made that it
should not take effect if there should be a total change in
the situation of the testator's family." The relative rights
of the widow and of the child born subsequent to the execution of the will were considered and emphasis laid upon
the fact that the widow's rights at common law had been
greatly enlarged and extended by statute so that now she
might take as an heir of her husband as well as contract
with her husband at the time of marriage for the payment
of an additional amount. On the other hand, it was stated
a child for whom no provision had been made in the will was
neither in a position to contract with his parent nor did the
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law make any provision for him in that situation, and
should such child receive nothing from his parent's estate,
the child "is deprived of the moral obligation due him from
the parent to provide for him upon the parent's death."
It seemed an illogical and unreasonable construction to the
Court "to hold under the circumstances that the wrong
done to the subsequently born child cannot be righted unless
it be shown that the marriage of the parents was subsequent
to the will, a fact of little or no import as affecting the
rights of the wife or mother ... ""
In support of this conclusion Judge Pattison referred
to the case of Johnston v. Johnston2 4 (decided by the Ecclesiastical Court in 1817) as holding that a will may be
revoked by the birth of a child alone without the concurrence of a subsequent marriage. Then the opinion, after
referring to the fact that although it was generally held
that marriage and birth of a child subsequent to the execution of a will are sufficient to revoke the will by implication, subject to certain exceptions, noted that the authorities were not in accord whether the concurrence of
both of such facts is essential. "In most of the states,
statutes have been passed relative thereto. In this state
no such statute has been passed, nor has there been any
case before this Court where this question has been raised
upon facts similar to those in this case .. .and hence we
are at liberty to follow either line of decisions, and, as those
holding that the concurrence of the facts named are not
essential appear to us to be most logical, we will hold that
the will, in this case, was impliedly revoked." 25
With due deference to the learned Judge, it seems that
he overlooked some very significant facts relative to the
Johnston case from which he quoted at length and that he
ignored entirely subsequent decisions and statutory enactments in England.
Just two years prior to the Johnston decision the Court
of the King's Bench had decided that the birth of a post"sKarr v. Robinson, supra note 1, 380, 381.
24

1 Phillim. 447 (1817).

- Karr v. Robinson, supra note 1, 382, 383.
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humous child alone did not revoke a previously executed
will when the pregnancy of the wife was unknown to her
or the testator at the time of his death.2" Lord .Ellenborough, C. J., speaking for the King's Bench, said, in part:
"The argument seems to be, that because the teAtator, had he known his situation ought to have revoked his will, therefore the law will impliedly revoke
it. But if it is to be understood that every will is
made upon a tacit condition that it shall stand revoked
whenever the testator by the circumstance of the birth
of a child becomes morally bound to provide for it,
I do not see why the birth of any one of a numerous
succession of children would not equally work a revocation. But where are we to stop? Is the rule to vary
with every change which constitutes a new situation
giving rise to new moral duties on the part of the
parent? Marriage, indeed, and the having of children,
where both these circumstances have occurred, has
been deemed a presumptive revocation, but it has not
been shown that either of them singly is sufficient."
(Italics supplied.)
In the Johnston case the testator executed his will in
Jamaica on July 21, 1793. At the time, he was married,
had one girl and one boy and expected additional issue.
By his will he left 10,000 pounds to his daughter, a like
sum to any child, or if more than one, to each child, of
which his wife was then ensient, and the residue of his estate to his son. His wife was apparently adequately taken
care of by reason of her ownership of valuable real estate.
The testator died suddenly from apoplexy in England on
July 31, 1815, leaving surviving him the son and daughter living at the time the will was made and four additional children born subsequent thereto, one of whom had
been born shortly after the execution of the will and was
therefore provided for in it. Although the will of July
21, 1793, was found among the testator's effects in Jamaica,
among his papers in England there was found a sketch
of a will in his handwriting, undated and unsigned but apparently written after July 6, 1814, in which paper he in2 Doe ex dem White v. Barford, 4 M. & S. 10 (1815).
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dicated an intention to provide for all of his children on
a more or less equal basis.
The three youngest children contended, through their
guardian, that their father died intestate. Counsel in support of the will cited White v. Barford2 7 but the ecclesiastical court found that the will was revoked "by subseqent birth of other children left unprovided for, aided by
other circumstances concurring clearly to show that it was
not the intention of the testator that the will should operate." These other circumstances were: the sketch of a
will indicating that the testator intended to make a new
will; his equal fondness for all of his children and his intention to treat them all alike; the old will was dated twenty-two years before and was found in Jamaica so he could
not have physically destroyed it while in England; his
sudden death as a result of a stroke of apoplexy; statements made to his wife intimating that he intended to execute a new will and that he was satisfied with the distribution made by law in cases of intestacy.
Sir John Nicholl, speaking for the Court, declared that
it was settled law (1) that implied revocation was not
within the Statute of Frauds; (2) that marriage and birth
together amount to implied revocation; (3) that marriage
alone does not; (4) that birth alone does not. (Italics supplied.) The question, therefore, was "whether subsequent
birth accompanied by circumstances as in this case and
leaving no doubt as to the testator's intention raised an
implication of revocation." He called attention to the fact
that although under the civil law birth alone revoked a
pre-existing will, under the English decisions this fact
standing unaccompanied by other circumstances did not
amount to a revocation. Thus, Sir John agreed with the
decision in White v. Barford because in that case he said
there was no evidence of an intention of the testator to
revoke his will, for neither he nor his wife knew that she
was pregnant and "therefore the husband could not in
effect have intended to revoke and the will could only be
" Ibid.
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held to be revoked by fiction of law." But the Court, in
White v. Barford, did not say, contended Sir John, "that
no possible combination of circumstances accompanying
subsequent birth of children cannot amount to implied revocation unless marriage be one of the concurrent circumstances." He therefore concluded "under all the circumstances in this (Johnston) case taking the subsequent birth
of issue as the essential basis of the proof and accompanied
as it is by the other concurrent circumstances, I am of the
opinion that the intention of the testator is plain and
without contradiction and that, therefore, I am warranted
in law and justice to pronounce against this will upon the
ground that it has been revoked." 2 8
It must be remembered that at the time Sir John was
speaking, the administration of the personal property of
a decedent was under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts and that these courts were not governed by the
same rules of evidence in force in the law courts, and that
the former, according to Sir John, would always receive
parol evidence upon questions of factum and revocation
and that the declarations of the testator were received as
corroborative evidence of his intent.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Johnston case does
not support the conclusion reached in Karr v. Robinson.
If it be contended that there were other circumstances in
the Robinson case, to-wit, the letter addressed to Mr. Karr,
to bring it within the scope of the Johnston case, the Court
of Appeals, although it referred to the letter, laid no emphasis upon it and, as heretofore stated, declared the sole
question to be "whether the subsequent birth of a child
alone without a subsequent marriage was sufficient to revoke the will."
Furthermore, the practice of the ecclesiastical courts in
permitting parol evidence to prove the testator's intention
in variance with his validly executed will was never adopted
by the common law courts. Thus Marston v. Roe ex dem
2

Supra note 21, 1 Phill. 447, 494-6.
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Fox and Halton 9 decided by fourteen out of the fifteen
judges of the three Courts of Westminster Hall, on writs
of error from the Court of Queen's Bench, refused to admit
evidence of the testator's intention that his will should not
be revoked to rebut the presumption of law that revocation has taken place by marriage and birth of a child. Tindal, C. J., said:
"And we all concur in the opinion that the revocation of the will takes place in consequence of a rule
or principle of law, independently altogether of any
question of intention of the party himself, and consequently that no such evidence is admissible. The plaintiff in error, in support of the proposition for which
he contends, has relied on the authority of various decisions of cases as well in the Ecclesiastical Courts as
in the Courts of Common Law. With respect to the
former we cannot but entertain considerable doubt
whether their authority can be held to apply to the
present question. For, whilst we are entirely convinced of the importance of uniformity of decision between the Courts of ecclesiastical and of common law
jurisdiction, where the same state of facts is under investigation, or the same principle of law is under discussion in each; and entertaining, as we do, at the
same time, the highest respect for the learning and
ability of those by whom justice is administered in the
Ecclesiastical Courts, we cannot forget that in the
question now before us we have to deal with the provisions of a statute with which the questions ordinarily
coming before them are wholly unincumbered. The
question now before us relates to the revocation or nonrevocation of a will devising real property; it is a
question whether such revocation shall be allowed to
depend upon evidence of intention, that is, upon evidence of which parol declarations of the testator may
confessedly form a part; whilst the Statute of Frauds
has anxiously and carefully excluded evidence of that
nature, with respect both to the original making and
the revoking of wills of land. The Ecclesiastical Courts,
on the other hand, are concerned in the granting probate of wills and testamentary papers, relating to personalty only, in which cases no statutory enactment
has excluded parol evidence of the intention of the tes"8 Ad. & E. 14 (1838).
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tator as to what shall or shall not be a testamentary
paper, or what shall or shall not amount to a revocation or republication of a will. On the contrary, the
evidence bearing on those points is generally mixed up
with declarations of the party, and frequently consists
of such declarations alone. The decisions therefore
in the Ecclesiastical Courts, referred to by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, may be sound decisions
with respect to the subject-matter to which they relate, and may yet furnish no authority on the case now
in judgment before us. And, if that question is to be
decided, as we think it is, by the weight of the authorities to be found in the Courts of Common Law, the
balance preponderates greatly in favor of the proposition that no evidence of intention is to be admitted
to rebut the presumption of law that a will is revoked
' 30
by subsequent marriage and the birth of a child."
In this case John Fox made a will on January 17, 1835,
devising certain lands to Anne Bakewell for life or so long
as she remained sole and unmarried, and after her decease
or marriage, to William Marston. Fox was contemplating
marrying Anne at the time and did, in fact, marry her on
February 21, 1835. On May 4 he was taken ill and died
in two hours. A child was born in October, 1835, the only
son and heir of John Fox. Marston claimed the lands as
devisee under the will and in the ejectment proceedings
brought against him, contended that the will had not been
revoked by subsequent marriage and birth of issue because of certain declarations Fox had made after his marriage to the effect that he intended that the will should
stand. The Court of Exchequer Chambers affirmed the judgment of the Queen's Bench that this evidence should not
be admitted and held the will to have been revoked.
In Israell v. Rodon,3 the Privy Council on appeal from
the Court of Ordinary in Jamaica, held that the will of
Henry Rodon was revoked by his subsequent marriage and
birth of child notwithstanding that he had previously and
in contemplation of marriage executed a settlement wherein he had made provision for his wife and the children
Ibid, 55-56.
312 Moore P. C. 51 (1839).
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of such marriage. Sir Herbert Jenner, in writing the opinion, did not refer to the Johnston case and was undoubtedly
influenced by Marston v. Roe. He did not rest his opinion
entirely on the latter decision, but referred to the practice
of the ecclesiastical courts and considered other facts such
as the remarriage of the surviving wife of the testator, the
execution of the will in England and the death of the testator in Jamaica and the failure of the marriage settlement
to make adequate provision for any children.
The Johnston case had, however, been cited by the Privy
Council in Castle v. Torre312 wherein a paper in the testator's handwriting dated four months prior to his death
but lacking the essential requisites of a valid will, was nevertheless admitted to probate as a second codicil by the
Ecclesiastical Court, as authority for the proposition that
a paper of the testator not valid as a will could not be
admitted to probate unless it "be shown that the testator
adhered to the intention expressed in the paper but was
prevented from finishing it."
In an effort to put an end to the confusion existing by
reason of the conflicting opinions in the various courts of
the realm, Parliament in 1837 passed the Wills Act,8 3 wherein it was definitely provided by Section XVIII "That every
Will made by a man or a woman shall be revoked by his
or her marriage (except a will made in exercise of a power
of appointment . . . . ),"' and by Section XIX, "That no
Will shall be revoked by any presumption of Intention on
the ground of an Alteration in Circumstances."
By Section XX the usual provisions for revocation by a subsequent will, writing or by burning, tearing or otherwise destroying, were again enacted.
The Wills Act was not referred to in the Marston case,
undoubtedly because the will had been executed prior to
1837. Nor, for the same reason, was the statute mentioned
8
in the opinion of In re Goods of Cadywold.
Therein the
"2 Moore P. C. 133 (1837).
7 Wm. IV and 1 Vict. cap. 26.
S1 Sw. & Tr. 34 (1858).
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testator had executed his will in March, 1828, devisilig his
real estate to his intended wife, Elizabeth, for life and
after her death to all of his children by his intended wife
living at the time of his death or born in due time afterward. His personalty he bequeathed to his intended wife
absolutely. He married Elizabeth apparently prior to the
enactment of the Wills Act and died leaving her and four
children of the marriage surviving. Sir C. Carswell held
36
35
on the authority of Marston v. Roe and Israell v. Rodon
that the will had been revoked.
The Cadywold case has been much criticized because it
ignored entirely the statement of the Court of Exchequer
in Marston v. Roe that if provision were made in the will
for the wife and after-born children, it should not be revoked. And although the case was decided without reference to the Wills Act of 1837, nevertheless, for some unaccountable reason, it seems to have been regarded as fixing the law under the Wills Act until the law was modified in 1925 by the Law of Property Act 3 7 which provides:
"A will expressed to be made in contemplation of
marriage shall, notwithstanding anything in section
eighteen of the Wills Act, 1837, or any other statutory
provision or rule of law to the contrary, not be revoked by the solemnization of the marriage contemplated."
In view of the failure of the English common law courts
to follow the decision in the Johnston case and its virtual
repudiation by the Act of Parliament in 1837, it seems
that it should not at this late date be considered of much
persuasive force, by our courts.
No American cases are cited in support of the opinion
in Karr v. Robinson although the learned judge refers to
the fact that there is a split in the authorities.38 He obI Supra note 29.
36Supra note 31.
15 Geo. V., cap. 20, sec. 177.
31It seems, however, that there is very little American authority, outside
of the statutes, which holds that birth alone amounts to a revocation. See
Rood, Treatise on the Law of Wills, Sec. 381; 68 Corpu8 Juris 840, tit.
Wills, See. 540.
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serves that in most of the states statutes have been passed
relative to the rights of after-born children. It has been
suggested by another writer 9 that the opinion was influenced by the trend of legislation in other states.
40
About seventeen years ago, Professor E. C. Goddard
made the charge that the courts had been guilty of "judicial usurpation resulting in rules of law flatly contradictory to the words of the statutes" when they held that a
will was revoked by subsequent marriage and birth of issue. It was argued that while the courts in many instances
expressly disclaim any intent of deciding contrary to the
Statute of Frauds and contend that the Statute was not
intended to affect certain matters before recognized as
amounting to a revocation, yet they seem, nevertheless, to
have ignored completely the final clause of Section Six
of the Statute of Frauds (providing for the revocation of
devises) which reads: " . . . . any former law or usage to
the contrary notwithstanding."
Whether we agree with Professor Goddard's criticism
or not, it is a fact that Baldwin v. Spriggs41 is regarded
as a leading case in line with the weight of authority and
is frequently quoted as supporting the proposition that
marriage and birth of issue, both concurring, revoke a will
previously made. It is possible that Karr v. Robinson may
gain similar eminence. On the other hand, the latter opinion leaves unanswered many questions which are suggested
by it.
1. Does birth of child revoke a will of a mother as
well as that of a father if such birth occurs subsequent
to the execution of the will?
2. Does the exception to the rule announced in Baldwin v. Spriggs still apply, namely, that a will, if it provides
for after-born children, will not be revoked by such birth?
3. If the exception still applies, what amounts to making provision for after-born children? Suppose $5 is left
Note on Karr v. Robinson, (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 787.
(1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 331.
' Supra note 9.
1
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for each after-born child? Is this sufficient? If not, how
much has to be left to each after-born child?4
4. Does the birth of an illegitimate child revoke the
will of his mother and also that of the putative father?
5. If a child is adopted subsequent to the execution of
a will, does the adoption have the same effect as birth?
6. Would the death of the after-born or adopted child
revoke the revocation and revive the old will?- Would it
make any difference whether such deceased child left issue
or spouse surviving?4.
7. If the birth of a child revokes the parent's will,
should not the Orphan's Court make inquiry into the facts
in each case and declare a revocation regardless of whether
a caveat is filed on behalf of the after-born child?"
8. Many a husband has executed a will leaving all of
his estate to his wife. The birth of issue has in no way
changed his wish as expressed in the will. He has full
confidence that his wife will adequately provide for the
children and does not desire that separate estates be set
up for them with the resulting expense and annoyance of
guardianship proceedings or the like. Does not Karr v.
Robinson require that such a testator execute a new will
if he wishes to die testate7
Many other questions may occur to the reader. This is
particularly so in view of the intimation by Chief Judge
Bond in a case45 following shortly after Karr v. Robinson,
that the Court recognizes that revocation may take place
by reason of changes in the testator's domestic relations.
The result is that confusion exists where there should be
certainty. To provide for a more definite standard for the
guidance of Orphan's Courts, attorneys, and testators,
it is recommended that the Legislature seriously consider
the enactment of a statute relating to the rights of children
"2See In re Mitchell's Estate, 144 N. Y. Misc. 262, 258 N. Y. S. 440 (1932).
41In matter of Horst, 264 N. Y. 236, 190 N. E. 475 (1934).
,4 Under the practice in the Orphans' Court for the County of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the petition filed by the executor for the probate of a
will must contain Information stating whether any children were born since
the execution of the will.
41Garner v. Garner, supra note 18, 426.
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born or adopted after the execution of the parent's last
will and testament.4 6 Undoubtedly, the courts would welcome such legislation.
0 The Committee on Land Laws and Inheritance Laws of the Maryland
State Bar Association is considering the proposal of a statute along these
lines. In their most recent report, Transactions of the Maryland State Bar
Association, 1936, Volume 41, page 41, they say: "Among other subjects,
the Commission (sic) is considering, and may propose bills to provide: (c)
To provide that the birth of an after-born child or children alone shall not
revoke a will drawn previous to the birth of said child (and after marriage), but that as to such child or children, the parent shall be deemed to
have died intestate, and such child or children shall be entitled to a proportionate share of the estate of the parent."
It has been stated that in all but two of the American states birth of
issue alone without marriage will work a partial or total Intestacy for the
benefit of neglected Issue, (1935) 35 Col. L. Rev. 787.
In connection with the possibility of statutory revision of the Maryland
rule, It might be well to consider the existing provisions of the statutes of
representative Eastern states. The Massachusetts statute, Annotated Laws,
Vol. VI, Ch. 191, Secs. 8. 9, in effect provides a total intestacy where marriage follows the execution of the will, unless intention otherwise is indicated. In New York, McKinney's Consolidated Laws, Annotated, Book 13.
Decedent Estate Law, Sees. 26, 28, 35, an after-born child neither provided
for nor mentioned takes an intestate share. In New Jersey, Compiled
Statutes, Volume 4, Wills, Secs. 20, 21, an after-born child takes an intestate
share, but If there were no Issue living at the time of the execution of the
will, the subsequent birth works a total revocation unless there were
provision for or mention of possible subsequent issue. In Virginia, Code,
1930, Wills, Secs. 5242, 5243, apparently subsequent birth of child works a
partial intestacy, but if such child die before reaching twenty-one, his share
reverts to the original beneficiaries under the will. The comprehensive
Pennsylvania statute, Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes Annotated, Title 20,
Sec. 273, provides a partial intestacy in favor of a subsequently married
spouse or subsequently born or adopted children, if such spouse or children
survive the testator. This latter statute is worthy of careful consideration
in the event that legislative change is to be undertaken In Maryland.

